On Formal Models of Legal Argument: Modelling Everyday Legal Argument

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A recent email

I am a practicing bankruptcy lawyer in Los Angeles, California. I am attempting to get a copy of Cabaret, or Hypo, or Cato, so that I can use it in my practice.

I saw your name and email on the Internet.

I was wondering - - is this type of software available to practitioners?

Thank you for any assistance or input you can provide.



An embarrassment

- Why are there so few fielded applications of our models of legal argument?
 - The knowledge-acquisition bottleneck
 - We focus too much on leading cases



Argumentation management systems


- Support for
 - drafting and visualising argumentation
 - structuring argumentative texts
- Useful for:
 - Sense making
 - Case file management
- Not knowledge-based!








This talk:


- Aim: A formal model of everyday legal argument:
 - With well-understood semantics and proof theory
 - Natural and intuitive for users
- Motivation: increase prospects of fielded applications
- Limitations:
 - Mainly civil-law systems
 - Only inference















- 1. An argument is *In* if all arguments defeating it are *Out*.
- 2. An argument is *Out* if it is defeated by an argument that is *In*.





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





An argument game for grounded semantics

- Rules of the game:
 - Each move replies to previous move
 - Proponent moves strict defeaters, opponent moves defeaters
 - A player wins iff the other player cannot move
- Result: A is in the grounded extension iff proponent has a winning strategy in a game about A.













P: A





































Aspic system: refining Dung



Argument structure based on Vreeswijk (1997)

- ≈ Trees where
 - Nodes are wff of logical language \mathcal{L} closed under negation
 - Links are applications of inference rules
 - Strict $(\phi_1, ..., \phi_1 \rightarrow \phi)$; or
 - Defeasible $(\phi_1, ..., \phi_1 \Rightarrow \phi)$
 - Reasoning starts from knowledge base $\mathcal{K} \subseteq \mathcal{L}$
- Defeat based on Pollock (rebut, undercut) + premise defeat
 - (Reasoning about) preferences can be added (cf. P+S97, Modgil 2009)
- Argument acceptability based on Dung (1995)




Why natural?

- Three case studies confirm it
 - more or less ...
- Model can cope with
 - Argument schemes
 - Allocations of burden of proof
 - Factor-based reasoning
 - Case-based reasoning

. . . .

Domain-specific vs. inference general inference rules

- R1: Bird \Rightarrow Flies
- R2: Penguin → Bird
- lacksquare Penguin $\in \mathcal{K}$
- R1: ϕ , $\phi \approx > \psi \Rightarrow \psi$
- Strict rules: all deductively valid inference rules
- ullet Bird pprox> Flies $\in\mathcal{K}$
- lacksquare Penguin \supset Bird $\in \mathcal{K}$
- lacksquare Penguin $\in \mathcal{K}$



Bird

Flies

Bird

Penguin

Bird ≈> Flies





```
Premise 1,
...,
Premise n
Therefore (presumably), conclusion
```


- But also critical questions
 - Negative answers are counterarguments



Witness testimony

Witness W says P
Therefore (presumably), P

- Critical questions:
 - Is W sincere?
 - Does W's memory function properly?
 - Did W's senses function properly?




Arguments from consequences

Action A brings about G, G is good


Therefore (presumably), A should be done

- Critical questions:
 - Does A also have bad consequences?
 - Are there other ways to bring about G?
 - **...**


Burden of proof: A problem




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


Burden of proof: A problem



If evidence is balanced: in `standard' ASPIC this the outcome ...








- Prakken & Sartor (1996,1997)
 - Dialectical asymmetry hardwired against proponent
- Prakken (2001)
 - Allocations of burden of persuasion made explicit
 - Dialectical asymmetry switches when the opponent moves an argument for a claim that she has to prove
 - A problem: new game has no semantics
 - Solved!(?)



Factor-based reasoning


- Factors are tentative reasons pro or con a conclusion
- To draw the conclusion, compare the sets of all applicable factors pro and con






Factor-based reasoning (2)

- Factors are tentative reasons pro or con a conclusion
- To draw the conclusion, compare the sets of all applicable factors pro and con
- Factor-based reasoning does not always use cases!
- Can also be modelled as argument accrual (Prakken 2005):
 - Fits the present model
 - Choice can be modelled as priority argument








Case-based reasoning

- Arguing for a solution of a new case by pointing at similarities to precedents
 - And attacking such arguments
- Case-based reasoning is not always factor-based!
 - Even when it does, the arguments often do not fit familiar AI & Law models



Case-based arguments in Sombekke (2006)







Conclusions on FBR/CBR

- Factor- and case-based reasoning are common in everyday legal argument
- But current AI & Law models may not fit reality



Conclusion (1)

- 'Standard' logical AI models capture a large part of inference in everyday legal argument
 - Applying rules: rule-exception structures for burden of proof
 - Reasoning about rule conditions:
 - Factor-based reasoning is accrual + reasoning about priorities
 - Case-based reasoning is often rule-based
 - Determining the facts: scenario construction does not fit the model (Bex 2009)



Conclusion (2)

- Abstract models of argumentation should be used for analysis, not for representation
- We should focus more on everyday legal argument
 - And more on case files